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It is true that the only article in the Code Napoleon that
requires a date on a will is article 970, prescribing the formalities for the olographic testament. But in view of the above, the
reason is clear: provision for a date had to be made because the
olographic will was not governed by the laws of Vent~se referred
to above.
It would appear that the failure of the Louisiana Civil Code
to make provision for the date in wills other than the olographic
will is due to the fact that these articles were taken from the

French articles which, as noted, were silent on the subject. But
this inadvertence is not grounds for saying that only the olographic will need be dated. As the court points out in the in-

stant case, there are very strong reasons why a date is necessary in all wills.

But all this is extraneous to the question presented for adjudication in the Gordon case, for there is no mistake or ambiguity

in requiring a complete date for validity thereof in the legislation pertaining to the statutory will.
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
NEIGHBORING LANDOwNERS-DANGEROUS

ACTIVITIES

The Round Trip Excursion to Article 667 and Return
"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever
he pleases, still he cannot make any work on it, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him." Louisiana
Civil Code article 667.
The basic nature of the obligation imposed by Louisiana's
anomalous Civil Code article 667 together with the proper ambit
for the operation of that article has been the subject of lively
debate among law writers for the past twenty-five years.' One
* Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See, e.g., the discussions of Professor Joseph Dainow in faculty symposia on the Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court-Torts: 8 LA. L. Rsv. 236
(1948), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAW 452 (1970);
11 LA. L. Rsv. 179 (1951), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA
TORTS LAW 456 (1970); 26 LA. L. Rev. 466 (1966), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY,

STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAw 456 (1970); 27 LA. L. Rsv. 438 (1967), W.
MALONE) and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAW 460 (1970). The
present writer has similarly held forth on the article in the same series of
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authority has consistently maintained that the article is a rule
of property, 2 while others, including the writer, prefer to regard
this article as an aspect of delictual liability. 8 The Louisiana
courts through their decisions have obligingly provided abundant
ammunition for both sides of the dispute.
The noteworthy entry for the journal now is Reymond v.
State, Department of Highways,4 a supreme court decision during
the recent term, which appears to have achieved a final resolution
of the issue-a resolution that leaves each of the scholarly disputants as both victor and vanquished. Here is the story.
The construction of Interstate 10 Highway through Baton
Rouge depreciated the value of the residential property of
plaintiff, Mrs. Reymond, in several respects. She suffered physical damage to her home resulting from vibrations caused by pile
driving activity, the repair cost of which was $2,500. In addition,
it was found that the value of her property was depreciated by
the impairment of its access to neighboring highways and by
the physical isolation of the residence from other parts of the
subdivision. This latter loss had been assessed on trial at $6,250.
The result was an award of $8,750 to Mrs. Reymond.
The supreme court regarded the contest as one controlled
exclusively by principles of expropriation. It affirmed the award
for physical damage, although the opinion observed significantly
that dimunition of market value of the property, rather than
cost of cure, was the proper measure of recovery. It concluded
that under the particular facts presented the cost of correction
would fairly reflect the lessening in market value.
The court declined to award the damages claimed for impairment of access and for isolation because it did not appear
that the loss suffered was peculiar to the plaintiff, but, rather,
symposia: 8 LA. L. REV. 248 (1948), M. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN
LOUISIANA TORTS LAW 453 (1970); 18 LA. L. REV. 63 (1957), W. MALONE and
L. GuERY, STUDIES IN LOUISANA TORTS LAW 461 (1970); 26 LA. L. R&v. 516
(1966), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAW 457 (1970).
An excellent comprehensive study by Professor F. F. Stone, Tort Doctrine in
Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, appears in 40 TUL. L. REv. 701
(1966). Also highly recommended is Comment, 20 LA. L. REv. 378 (1960),
W. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAW 441 (1970). See
also Note, 26 LA. L. Rsv. 409 (1966), W. MALONE and L. GUERRY, STUDIES IN
LOUISANA TORTS LAW 465 (1970).
2. See Dainow, note 1 aupra.
3. See Malone, note 1 aupra. I gather from Professor Stone's article,
supra, that he shares my views. The same, I believe, is true of Mr. Herget's
observations in his Comment, 20 LA. LAW REv. 378 (1960).
4. 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375 (1970).
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that it was of a kind general to the entire neighborhood. Without
denying that there was an impairment of value by reason of
the routing of the multilane highway, the court laid emphasis
on the fact that public improvements will inevitably cause discomfort, disturbance and inconvenience to property owners in
the close vicinity of the newly established highway. 5 The opinion
wisely refrained from any attempt to draw the precise point
where the inconvenience suffered by a complainant so exceeds
the suffering to be endured by the entire community that it
becomes a damage that can be regarded as special and peculiar,
and hence compensable. The majority was content to conclude
that no such point had been reached in Mrs. Reymond's case,
and it was here that three Justices disagreed.
The interesting feature of the opinion from the standpoint
of Louisiana tort and property theory was the fact that the majority opinion deliberately embarked upon an interesting and
elaborate discussion of the applicability of Civil Code article 667
to a controversy of this kind, and concluded that the article was
not relevant.
Before attempting any discussion of the substance of the
controversy concerning article 667, it seems advisable to make
mention of the fact that two members of the court 6 expressed
the opinion that any discussion of this article in the majority
opinion was unnecessary. It is easy for this reviewer to appreciate why the majority felt otherwise and went into the matter
as it did.
The precise nature of the claim asserted by a landowner
against a public body may be a matter of importance for several
purposes: the character of the suit may be determinative of the
necessity of showing fault; it may serve to establish those
elements of loss that can or cannot be legally recognized; it may
fix the measure of the quantum of damage recoverable. Futhermore, at one time the choice of theory could determine whether
the defendant public body would enjoy an immunity from liability for conduct that would be actionable if the defendant
were a private corporation. If the public corporation were
charged with a tort at one time it might have successfully con5. For a general discussion of this problem, see M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN,
EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA C. IM, § 4(D) and (E)

6. Hamlin and Sanders, JJ.

(1970).
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tended that as a sovereign it could do no wrong;7 if it were
charged with a taking of private property or the infliction of
damage in making a public improvement, its exercise of the
power of expropriation could carry with it an obligation to
make restitution. Similarly, if the landowner were able to assert
that he enjoyed a servitude conferring upon him a right of enjoyment free of interference by a "neighbor," he might insist
his claim was not an assertion that a tort had been committed
but rather an effort to enforce a servitude. Therefore, the plaintiff might enjoy recovery despite the rubric that the king can
do no "wrong." Although in the instant case the court experienced no difficulty in concluding that under article 3, section 35
of the Louisiana Constitution, the clause to "sue and be sued"
of LA. R.S. 48:22 effectuates a general waiver of any immunity
that might formerly have been enjoyed by the Highway Department, 8 nevertheless this same conclusion-that sovereign immunity against tort was unavailable under the facts presentedcould have been reached by avoiding tort and recognizing instead that the claim was one for the enforcement of a servitude.
Although this same contention concerning sovereign immunity
had been dismissed by a court of appeal in an earlier decision,9
and a writ of certiorari had been refused by the supreme court,' 0
the matter perhaps should not be regarded as conclusively settled
adversely to a claimant of a servitude.
Perhaps the most significant reason for a resort to article 667
by plaintiff was the fact that she failed to show that the physical
damage suffered was caused by negligence. The shortcoming
here could be avoided if she could convince the court that she
was entitled to assert a privilege under article 667 and that the
privilege was of such a character that its invasion was actionable
even if no fault were involved. Although the court did reach a
conclusion favorable to the plaintiff and allowed a recovery despite the absence of fault, it deliberately rejected the application
of article 667 and affirmed the award of damages for physical
injury by resort to public law principles of expropriation. It
7. See background discussion In Fordham & Pegues, Local Government
Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana, 3 LA. L. RPv. 720 (1941), W. MIALONE
and L. GuEmmY, STUDIES IN LOUISIANA TORTS LAw 845 (1970).

8. Reymond v. State, Dep't of Highways, 255 La. 425, 436, 231 So.2d 375,
379 (1970). See also Herrin v. Perry, 254 La. 933, 228 So.2d 649 (1969).
9. Klein v. Louisiana Dep't of Highways, 175 So.2d 454 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965).
10. Klein v. Louisiana Dep't of Highways, 248 La. 369, 178 So.2d 658
(1965).
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does not follow, however, that the court's venture into a discussion of the reasons why article 667 was not applicable was
an unnecessary meandering of the opinion, as was suggested by
the dissenting judges. A matter of damage measurement was
involved in the choice of theory. The writer of the opinion took
meticulous pains to make clear that the measure of recovery
should be determined by the lessening of the market value of
the land by reason of the conduct complained of. This is the
normal measure of damage where the claim is based upon expropriation. On the other hand it can be surmised that the amount
of damage to be recovered under article 667 would be measured
by the cost of repairing the damage inflicted. Although the difference in the method of fixing damages was fortuitously of no
significance under the facts presented, in future decisions it
could be a matter of great importance. I suggest that even for
this reason alone the court was entirely justified in launching a
discussion of the reasons that prompted it to reject the plaintiff's
urging that liability be imposed through resort to the servitude
argument.
The court's undertaking to explain limitations on the operative ambit of Civil Code article 667 is entirely justifiable, as this
writer sees it, for a further reason: an ultimate question to be
answered was, what elements of loss are to be regarded in
assessing damages against those who undertake a public improvement that has lessened the value of neighboring private
property ? Under principles relative to public appropriation and
under such tort principles as may be applicable, the answer is
fairly well settled: neither an impairment of the view or outlook
of the property affected nor a lessening of the owner's convenience of access to public roads are recognized elements of loss
except under sharply limited circumstances (circumstances over
which the court can exercise an effective control)."' If, however,
the victim could avoid these traditional approaches and could
invoke some independent competing principle of liability-if he
could maintain that the situation was neither merely another
incident of inverse expropriation nor the mere creation of a
public nuisance, but rather, the judicial recognition of an enforceable servitude on the part of the plaintiff, then a new avenue of liability would be open for exploration, inviting a not
implausible contention that the servitude with which the dell.

Klein v. Louisiana Dep't of Highways,

Cir. 1965).

175 So.2d 454 (La. App. 4th
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fendant interfered embraces the values of a pleasant view and
of neighborhood convenience. In short, a new theory might
arguably bring a new and broader concept of the range of losses
to be recognized, unembarrassed by the established limitations
on liability under tort or public law principles.
In view of the fact that both courts below had granted recovery under article 667 expressly and that the damages that
had been awarded under this approach were held improper by
the supreme court with respect both to the types of losses properly compensable and with respect to the technique of measuring
the amount to be recovered, it seems the supreme court's announcement of its reasons for rejecting the application of article
667 should be regarded as considerably more than a mere venture
into the world of dictim.
The Decision
The court's announced version of the nature of the obligation imposed under Civil Code article 667 and the more closely
circumscribed area imposed by the court for its operation can
be stated in a few words: the article expresses a rule of property, not of tort. Hence, for situations falling within the proper
operative ambit of article 667 the incidents of property law must
attach. Presumably, this means that the prescriptive period of
one year for tort controversies does not apply, 12 and that whatever shreds may remain of governmental immunity from tort
in this state have no application in claims appropriate to this
article.
Once it is recognized that the rule of the article is one of
property, whereby a servitude is imposed, it follows that the
article's application must be confined to those entities that can
be regarded as subservient to a servitude. Thus, the court observed the article must be restricted in application to other
estates. The importance of this limitation lies in the fact that it
excludes from article 667 coverage all harmful activities of men,
except as such activities may bring about a physical alteration
of the subservient estate. The opinion clearly shows that the
court was entirely cognizant of the importance of this exclusion
of harmful activity or enterprise. The court freely confessed that
several earlier decisions had subjected to the servitude of article
12. The contrary conclusion had been reached by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal in Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 170 So.2d
125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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667 a fairly wide range of human activities, including pile driving, emission of nauseous smoke and fumes, and release into
the air of poisons injurious to neighboring crops.
The court further supported the newly imposed limitation by
observing that the language of the article in question prohibits
only the making of any work upon the land which may deprive
one's neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own. 18 A work, the

court stated, denotes some structure upon the subservient premises which injures the neighbor. Presumably, any alteration of the
condition of the offending property so that its physical state is
changed to the injury of the neighbor would fall within the
article's coverage. The opinion proceeds by pointing to the fact
that article 667 has no counterpart in the French Civil Code and
that it was probably a verbatim translation of a paragraph in
the writings of Domat.14 It is then pointed out that the rule or
principle as announced by Domat is clarified by several illustrations furnished by that author in his text. Each of these, the
opinion emphasizes, refers to a harm-inflicting structure of some
kind, such as a roof that discharges water on the neighbor or a
bakehouse near the boundary that proves to be a fire hazard
because of its proximity. No bare activities, however dangerous
they might be, are mentioned anywhere by the early writer.
With reference to the Domat passage, the dissenting opinion
of Justice Sanders urges that the classic author's illustrations
must be understood in the light of the limited variety of harmful
activities that could have been anticipated at the time he wrote.
Crop dusting, the use of dynamite, the emission of smoke and
fumes by industrial plants, and similar annoyances which are all
too characteristic of our modern society were obviously unknown
in the eighteenth century, and hence no reference to such hazards should be expected. But, conceding that this is true, as the
dissent indicates, nevertheless a distinction between harmful
activities, on the one hand, and dangerous structures, on the
other, is one that would have as readily occurred to a writer
then as it would today. For instance, the most obvious hazard
that would be expected to emanate on one tract of land and
spread its destructive force to neighboring property would seem
to be fire. Yet it is significant that no mention is made of a default in the building or maintenance of a destructive fire that
13. The article is quoted in full at p. 231 mipra.
14. J. DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER §§ 1046, 1047

transl. 1861).

(Strahan
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escapes and does damage to surrounding property. Instead, the
author appears constrained to refer specifically to the placing of
physical objects such as stoves and fireplaces against a common
wall.
This writer suggests that no effort to concentrate upon the
chrysalis of history or tradition from which article 667 arguably
emerged can afford a very meaningful approach to an appraisal
of the soundness of the Reymond decision. Attention to the underlying considerations of public policy affords a more productive attack. Here, available arguments against the more restricted
scope of article 667 announced by the decision deserve serious
attention. As society becomes more complex and dangerous, the
entire juridical world (not merely the common law or the civil
law) is moving apace toward an imposition of liability for the
hurts inflicted by the many hazardous activities around us without reference to the presence or absence of blameworthiness on
the part of those who conduct them. The capacity of enterprise
to bear the costs of the losses it inflicts upon mankind is fast
becoming a consideration that attracts as much sympathy in
fixing liability as the familiar impulse to avoid penalizing the
innocent. The evidence of this shift in the spectrum faces us at
every hand. In France, for example, the operator of a motor
vehicle is subject to unqualified liability for all the injury he
inflicts. This liability is achieved through a manipulation of
traditional articles of the French Civil Code. 5 We are on the
verge of achieving the same result in the United States through '
statutes that would cast the loss incurred by reason of the operation of motor vehicles upon the institution of automobile insurance, which would be made mandatory. 16 Strict liability is now
imposed nearly everywhere upon manufacturers for all injuries
inflicted by any product released by them that could be characterized as "defective."' 1 Again, the public is insisting that
society be protected against the pollution of air and water and
15. The key article here Is FRENCH Civ. CODE art. 1384, dealing with liability
for the acts of "things," discussed in Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LA. L. REv. 231 (1952).

16. Massachusetts has become the first state to adopt a no-fault plan
for automobile liability. Mass. Senate Bill 1580 of 1970. The measure
becomes effective Jan. 1, 1971. Even more significant is the portended incursion of the federal government Into the field of no-fault automobile liability
under the Interstate commerce clause. S. 4339, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
introduced by Senator Hart (Mich.) in September, 1970, has been referred to
the Senate Commerce Committee.
17. See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 402A (1965).
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other harms affecting our natural environment by modern industrial operations. This, too, is exerting pressure upon the
courts to extend liability increasingly without regard to who
may or may not have been "to blame."
The need and direction is becoming increasingly obvious,
and few judges, lawyers, or writers would disagree in their estimate that this is the ultimate objective toward which the legal
order is now moving at a dizzy pace. For this reason one might
be tempted to regard with indiscriminate favor all rules that
would result in unqualified liability. By the same token one may
be tempted to look with a cynical eye upon a decision that would
inhibit the operation of any no-fault principle or which would
tend to restrict the area in which such principle could be made
effective. Any decision that would have this effect is in danger of
being regarded as a reactionary movement against the tide of the
times.
Is any such observation appropriate to the Reymond decision? Although article 667 has served as a resort in support of
unqualified liability for harmful activities in past decisions, I
cannot feel that the opinion in Reymond, which sharply limits
the article's area of operation, should be regarded as anything
other than a commendable and important step in the right direction toward an intelligent and discriminate handling of enterprise liability for hazardous undertakings. I hope to explain in
the following paragraphs why I feel this is so.
First, it is particularly noteworthy that the court in Reymond made clear the fact that it intended no retreat from the
proposition that there should be recovery "for damages resulting
from the use of dangerous instrumentalities or materials or
man's engagement in inherently dangerous activities." "We simply find article 667 inapplicable in such situations."'" Thus there
is no reason to regard the decision in any way as marking a retreat from the objective of unqualified enterprise liability in
appropriate instances. In other words, the destination, in terms
of policy, has not changed. The only change is the abandonment
of the old vehicle that formerly had served as one means of
transportation toward unqualified liability in Louisiana. The
question, therefore, is whether article 667 should be regarded as
a good device that is fairly adaptable to the purpose to which
18. Reymond v. State, Dep't of Highways, 255 La. 425, 445, 231 So.2d

375, 383 (1970).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

it must be put. If so, it should not be cast aside. If, on the other

hand, the court is conscious of its need for better and more
flexible machinery to assist it in handling the problem of liability for hazardous enterprises, there is neither compulsion of
history nor any demand of overriding tradition that should compel it to retain the older approach. We are justified, then, in
making inquiry as to whether the language of article 667 affords
a useful and discriminating tool for the job it must perform in
modern society. Or is the article too awkward and too blunt for
the task to which it must be put? This writer feels that it definitely is.
In undertaking to make an appraisal of the demands of
policy we must bear in mind that we are in a transitional state
between fault liability, on the one hand, and a liability predicated
solely upon the creation of risk and a recognized capacity to pay,
on the other. We are not yet prepared to surrender completely
the notion that in most instances individuals should not be
obliged to pay merely because the activity in which they were
engaged happened fortuitously to go wrong. Perhaps we shall
never desert the fault principle entirely. There is enough of the
nineteenth century left in us to prompt us to afford some place
of shelter for the prudent individual who inflicts harm through
sheer inadvertence. This impulse finds an expression in the
"fault" language of article 2315. On the other hand, a host of
modern enterprises bring substantial wealth to those who conduct them, while imposing extravagant and irreducible risks of
harm upon others-risks so severe that they cannot be wholly
avoided even by the exercise of all feasible precautions. Thus
the notion of unqualified enterprise liability arises. But it is important to bear in mind that all human activity does not fit the
picture here, and courts, in the adjudication of controversies as
they arise, cannot escape the responsibility of sorting out the
types of enterprise conduct that should be subjected to absolute
liability and separating these from those activities that should
be held liable only when they are improperly conducted. At this
point the hallmark of good legal doctrine lies in its elasticity
and in its capacity to afford as much assistance as possible to
the courts as they attempt to separate the sheep from the goats
in the pastures of enterprise.
Furthermore, although living in a complex and congested
world obliges us all to accept certain harms and annoyances
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without recourse, it does not oblige us to submit to all inconveniences indiscriminately. For this reason another process of
selection is unavoidable. The harms that can be recognized as
compensable, as well as the enterprises that can be made to
suffer without qualification, must be sorted out by the courts
as intelligently and in as meaningful a way as is possible. Here
again, doctrine must be of as much assistance as doctrine can
ever be, and at least it should not get in the way of the decisonal
process.
It strikes this writer that article 667 does not lend itself well
to the purpose of adjusting conflicts of the types suggested in
the preceding paragraph. If, as would seem proper, the inescapable accident cost of a given hazardous activity ought to be so
allocated by law that this cost can ultimately be passed on in
dilution as a charge upon the numerous consumers or users of
the goods or services produced by the activity, then it would
seem that the enterprise-the individual or corporation that conducts the activity-is the appropriate unit that should initially
shoulder the cost burden; for the enterpriser is in the best position to convert the anticipated accident charge into an item of
capital cost, to insure against it, and to transfer the resulting
premium cost into the price structure of the goods or services
the activity produces. Furthermore, it is only the enterpriser who
is in a position to adopt or to devise those precautionary measures
that may serve in the future to minimize the chance of a recurrence of the tragedy. If this is true, the deficiences of article 667
are immediately apparent. The language of that article makes
no reference to enterprise liability as such. Instead, the finger of
responsibility is pointed exclusively toward a "proprietor." This
term indicates at least a holder of a property interest of some
kind in land, even though this interest may be less than full
ownership. Of course, the owner of the estate upon which a
hazardous enterprise is being conducted may, by chance, serve
also in the role of enterpriser, as where an industrial plant owned
and operated by defendant contaminates the air and water of
the neighborhood. But, on the other hand, he may not be engaged in any enterprise whatsoever, or the enterprise that he
does conduct may be of a basically non-hazardous character.
Nevertheless, liability against him may be strenuously urged
under the language of article 667. Town of Jackson v. Mounger
Motorslg affords an excellent illustration of the reaction of a
19. 98 So.2d 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
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Louisiana court when faced with this dilemma. A truck was
parked on Mounger Motors Used Car Lot. After business hours,
one Bolden, while attempting to take the truck without permission, backed it into the adjacent town fire hall and caused
the damages sued for. The town, being unable to establish negligence, based its reliance upon article 667. The contention was
that the defendant's property had been so used as to injure the
neighboring town hall, and defendant, the owner, should automatically be subjected to liability therefor. The argument failed.
In denying recovery, the court of appeal, speaking through Tate,
J., observed that "the doctrine [of article 667] importing liability
to the non-negligent owner of property for damage caused by
his legal use of his own property applies only when such use
'involves a high degree of risk of harm to others and is abnormal
in the community' [citing Prosser, Torts (Second Edition 1955)
329], or is 'unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where
it is maintained, in the light of the character of that place and
its surroundings.' "20 This observation is highly significant. The
author of the opinion was obliged to make an entire reconstruction of the language of article 667 so as to restrict "proprietor" to "proprietor engaged in extrahazardous enterprise."
In other instances the "proprietor" or owner may be merely
the customer receiving the benefit of services of an ultrahazardous character which are performed under contract. Here again
the primary risk bearer should be the enterpriser because he
alone is so strategically situated that he can insure against the
prospect of loss that is inherent in the operation of his business,
and he alone can pass along the premiums indiscriminately to
all the customers ("proprietors") he serves as an increase in the
contract price. In most cases it will be found that the enterpriser
has done this, and each proprietor has supported the cost of the
accident risk in advance. Nevertheless, the language of the
article in question does not contemplate that anyone except a
proprietor is subject to unqualified liability. Here again, however,
the courts have managed to hold the enterpriser to a strict responsibility even though he is in no sense an owner. In such
case the language restricting liability to the "proprietor" is simply ignored. Thus, in Gotreaux v. Gary2' the supreme court
imposed absolute liability upon an enterpriser engaged in the
obviously hazardous business of cropdusting by airplane. The
20. Id. at 699.
21. 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957).
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duster, together with the owner of the land who had contracted
for the work, was obliged to pay for the defoliation of a neighbor's property even though no negligence was established. Similarly, a petroleum producer and its contractor, an engineering
concern, were subjected to no-fault liability under the article
for vibration and concussion damage sustained by plaintiff on
his residence, although both defendants were bare enterprisers,
rather than proprietors of adjacent estates. 22 It is noteworthy
that in each of these instances the courts were able to achieve
results consonant with a sound administration of enterprise liability for ultrahazardous activities; and they did so by invoking
the provisions of article 667. But to this writer, at least, the
important observation is that in each instance the author of the
opinion was obliged to work against the article upon which the
court was relying, either by wholly ignoring its strictures, or by
radically reformulating the tenets of the codal provision relied
upon.
Again, it should be noted that many costly activities of an
ultrahazardous character are frequently conducted on public
highways, on public bodies of water, or in the public airlanes.
Here, any notion of a "proprietor" making a "work" upon his
"estate" is entirely lacking. Can the inflexible language of
article 667 again be transmuted through some magic of interpretation into a pronouncement of unqualified liability to be imposed on all dangerous activities quite without reference to
where they are conducted? Or, should we conclude, obedient to
what the article clearly says, that liability for the conduct of
activities on one's own private premises is to be determined by
a set of no-fault principles, while an engagement in dangerous
operations in public places is to be judged solely by reference
to the presence or absence of negligence, as dictated by article
2315?
Finally, the only object afforded protection under the express language of article 667 is the "neighbor." Although one
early opinion suggested that this term must be restricted to the
man next door,2 Civil Code article 651 states that "it suffices
that they [the lands] be sufficiently near, for one to derive bene.
fit from the servitude on the other." But even under this broader
22. Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845
(1955).
23. McIlhenny v. Roxanna Petroleum Corp., 122 So. 165 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1929).
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conception of neighbor, a physical proximity of some kind existing between two estates is clearly contemplated. This would
suggest that the only damage recognizable under the article is
an injury to a property interest (damage to the estate that enjoys
the benefit of the servitude). Perhaps an accompanying injury
to the owner or his family might be recognized as parasitic damage entitled to coverage. But what is to be done if the victim of
the miscarried enterprise happens to be a pedestrian on the
public way or even a casual visitor on neighboring premises?
Of course, the phrases of the article might again be maneuvered
by an ingenious and creative judge so as to support coverage
for an indeterminate wide group of persons and interests. Indeed,
a court may be induced to observe in a pious moment that enterprise should be its neighbor's keeper. But here again this kind of
effort to achieve justice through a frantic manipulation of language marks an unhappy approach to the solution of human
problems, provided that some more straightforward theoretical
approach can be made available. Although a highly skilled golfer
might manage to shoot par golf with a putter, he can do a much
better job with a full set of suitable clubs.
After rejecting article 667 for enterprise harms, the court
took care in the Reymond opinion to do no more than suggest
in the broadest terms possible the type of reagent by which
enterprise liability should be tested. It observed that unqualified
liability could be imposed upon harms inflicted by "inherently
hazardous activities." Beyond this, the opinion is deliberately
cautious: "We need not and do not state the basis, authority,
or source for recovery in cases of this nature. ' 2 4 The decision
thus clears the path for resort to a newly formulated body of
doctrine leading to enterprise liability.
The idea of absolute liability for inherently hazardous activities is one which, as we have already observed, is emerging
both in America and abroad. In France, the development of the
theory of le risque cra and the recent and dramatic expansion
of liability for the acts of "things" based upon article 1384 of
the French Civil Code are indicative of the flexibility of the
civil law in affording recognition of absolute liability in appropriate instances. Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code (cor24. Reymond v. State, Dep't of Highways, 255 La. 425, 445-46, 231 So.2d
375, 383 (1970).
25. See the discussion in F. LAwsoN, NEGLIGENCR IN THE CIV LAW § 19
(1950). The expansion of article 1384 of the Code Napolon so as to impose
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responding substantially to article 1382 of the French Civil
Code) which imposes liability in terms of "fault" need not be
restricted arbitrarily to negligent or intentional misconduct. The
term, fault, can be regarded as sufficiently expansive to meet
the needs of our complex and dangerous society. 28 The term is
properly applicable to the enterpriser who undertakes an activity
which he knows in advance involves a high degree of risk to
society even after all reasonable precautions have been taken.
This risk is inherent in the enterprise undertaking itself, and for
creating it the enterpriser can appropriately be made to answer.
This is his compact with society. It is the price he pays for the
privilege of undertaking the enterprise. The act of launching a
dangerous business or operation in the face of a certain although
unavoidable chance of injury to the public can appropriately be
characterized as "fault," even though society tolerates and even
encourages the activity as so conducted.7
The designation of certain activities as inherently dangerous
or as ultrahazardous and the consequent imposition of absolute
liability upon those who conduct them has become current practice in most American jurisdictions and has found its expression
in the Restatement of Torts.28 This recognition of liability beyond
negligence can only be regarded as an indigenous American development. It is not to be attributed to English common law,
even though one of its germinal sources was probably the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher," the famous English decision of
the mid-nineteenth century. The Rylands v. Fletcher rule, however, related only to substances or things that escaped from land
and which in escaping injured neighboring property.80 There is
a noticeable similarity between these restrictions and the limitaunqualified liability for the acts of "things" under the care ("garde") of
defendant is discussed in Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workme's Compensation, 12 LA. L. Rzv. 231, 238 and following
(1952).
26. 1 H. MAZEAUD & A. TUNe, TRArr DA LA RESPONSABILITh Crvx no. 620
(1965). See also the suggestion in Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The
Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 TUL. L. Rov. 701, 709 (1966).
27. An Interesting parallel is found In the discussion of A. EHRENZWMO,
NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
28. RESTATEMENT 0 TORTS H 519-24 (1939).
29. L. R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
30. Among the many excellent treatments of the Rylands v. Fletcher
development are: J. CHARLESWORTH, LIABILITY FOR DANGmous THINGS (1922);
F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 344 (1926); Bohlen, The Rule in
Rylandus v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 423 (1911); Wigmore, Responsibility
for Tortlou.s Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1894). One of the most
recent and comprehensive is W. PROssER, SELECTED TOPICs ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 135 (1953).
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tions that seem to inhere in the language of article 667. Any expectation that the English doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher would
eventually be enlarged in that country so as to embrace highly
dangerous activities wherever they may be conducted or to
afford protection against harms beyond those suffered by neighboring landowners was sharply nipped in the bud by the House
of Lords in 1946.81 In England, Rylands v. Fletcher remains
strictly a landowner's doctrine of limited utility.
Although the American courts were hostile at first toward
even this modest step in the direction of absolute liability, as
American industry put aside its swaddling clothes at the turn
of the century and emerged in full stature as a source of peril
to the public (but a source endowed with an economic capacity
to support the costs of the damages of its creation), our American judges were impelled to reconsider the prospect of imposing
absolute liability, and they succeeded in transforming the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher into a principle appropriate to our own national needs.3 2 As a result, the term, ultrahazardous activity,
which appears nowhere in the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine, became the touchstone to liability on the American scene. The
person or organization conducting such an activity was subjected to liability irrespective of where his operation was being
conducted or who his victim might be. Once the term "ultrahazardous activity" was evoked, the courts proceeded to determine the appropriate boundaries for the phrase. The interpretative process moved in two directions; first, there was an effort
to determine in each instance whether there was a substantial
likelihood of serious danger in the operation in question that
could not be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care;
second, there followed an inquiry by the court as to whether
the activity or the operation was one that had become a matter
of common usage at the place where it was conducted.38 Upon
these two inquiries rested the decisional process. A new approach has thus been molded through the creativity of American
judges and unless there is a sudden change in the judicial climate
31. Read v. J. Lyons & Co., Ltd. [1946], 2 All E. R. 471. Malone,
Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law of
Torts, 31 LA. L. REv. 1, 41 (1970).

32. See note 30 supra.
33. These requirements appear as RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1939).
They are discussed in some detail In W. PRoSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 77

at 523 (3d ed. 1964).
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of Louisiana, there is reason to believe that the Reymond decision
has opened the gate for a course of meaningful development along
these lines in this state.
TORTS
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In Cartwright v. Firemen's Insurance Co.' the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held emphatically that under Louisiana law
an automobile owner may not be held liable under the theory
of strict liability for damages resulting from a latent defect
in the brakes of his vehicle. The court pointed out that strict
liability, or liability without fault, may not be invoked as a
theory of recovery unless provided for by the legislation of
the state. The court further specifically stated that the policy
considerations inherent in the problem were properly for the
legislature rather than for the court.
In Fairbanks v. Travelers Insurance Co., 2 involving operation of vehicles on the highways, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal applied and interpreted the so-called "slow speed statute '8
to find for the plaintiffs. It is the first appellate case reported
under this statute. The crucial language of the statute forbids
the operation of a motor vehicle upon the highways "at such
a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic." 4 The court found that it was for the trier of
fact to determine whether the speed in a given case was slow
enough to constitute a violation of the statute. As the court
pointed out, excessive speed under certain conditions has long
been found to be negligence. It is hardly debatable that an
excessively slow speed on modern highways can be dangerous
and therefore should be classifiable as negligence.
A statement by that court in dictum may give rise to trouble
in future cases of this nature. The court said:
"Thus, the slightest degree of inattentiveness by the driver
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